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On 22 January 2019, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe agreed the text of 
Resolution 2253: Sharia, the Cairo Declaration and the European Convention on Human 
Rights.2 The Resolution begins – on an uncontroversial note – by reiterating ‘the obligation 
on member States to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as 
enshrined in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights … which represents one 
of the foundations of a democratic society’. It then goes on, however, to recall that the 
Assembly ‘has on several occasions underlined its support for the principle of the separation 
of State and religion, as one of the pillars of a democratic society’.3 This statement is not 
entirely non-contentious: it ignores the situation in several member States of the Council of 
Europe and is based more on notions of laïcité than on the observable facts in countries such 
as England, Denmark, Finland and Norway that have state Churches.4 Unfortunately, this 
simplification and confusion set the tone for what is to follow.  
 
The main thrust of the Resolution focuses on two issues. First, it begins from the premise that 
‘the various Islamic declarations on human rights adopted since the 1980s, while being more 
religious than legal, fail to reconcile Islam with universal human rights’.5 This leads the 
Assembly to express ‘great concern that three Council of Europe States – Albania, 
                                                        
1 This comment is an expanded version of a blog post originally published on Law and Religion UK. 
2 Available at <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=25353>. 
3 Paragraph 3. For example, in Recommendation 1804 of 2007, the Assembly asserted at paragraph 4 that ‘one of 
Europe’s shared values, transcending national differences, is the separation of Church and State. This is a 
generally accepted principle that prevails in politics and institutions in democratic countries’. 
4 Finland has two: the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Orthodox Church. It is also contentious in countries 
that do not have a state Church as such. In Malta, for instance, Article 2 of the Constitution declares that ‘The 
religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Church have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong’. See generally N 
Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 Para 4.  
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Azerbaijan and Turkey’ have explicitly or implicitly endorsed such declarations. Secondly, 
the Assembly states that it is ‘greatly concerned about the fact that Sharia law including 
provisions which are in clear contradiction with the Convention – is applied, either officially 
or unofficially, in several Council of Europe member States, or parts thereof’.6 In relation to 
this second issue, the Assembly states that ‘Sharia rules on, for example, divorce and 
inheritance proceedings are clearly incompatible with the Convention’.7 The Resolution 
‘regrets’ that sharia law is still being applied in Thrace (Eastern Greece) and that ‘muftis 
continue to act in a judicial capacity without proper procedural safeguard’ and that ‘in 
divorce and inheritance proceedings – two key areas which muftis have jurisdiction – women 
are at a distinct disadvantage’. 
 
The Resolution also expresses concern about ‘the “judicial” activities of “Sharia Councils” in 
the United Kingdom’8 – hence this Comment. It will discuss two issues: paragraph 8, in 
which the Assembly identifies why the activities of sharia councils in the UK are of concern, 
and paragraph 14, which calls upon UK authorities to act in several respects, reporting back 
by June 2020 on the actions they have taken.9 
 
THE PROBLEM 
The text of Paragraph 8 is worth giving in full: 
 
‘The Assembly is also concerned about the “judicial” activities of “Sharia Councils” 
in the United Kingdom’. Although they are not considered part of the British legal 
system, Sharia councils attempt to provide a form of alternative dispute resolution, 
whereby members of the Muslim community, sometimes voluntarily, often under 
considerable social pressure, accept their religious jurisdiction mainly in marital and 
Islamic divorce issues, but also in matters relating to inheritance and Islamic 
commercial contracts. The Assembly is concerned that the rulings of the Sharia 
councils clearly discriminate against women in divorce and inheritance cases. The 
Assembly is aware that informal Islamic Courts may exist in other Council of Europe 
member States too.’ 
                                                        
6 Para 5.  
7 Para 6.  
8 Para 8.  
9 Para 15. 
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It should go without saying that discrimination and intimidation are clearly wrong and that 
governments cannot simply turn a blind eye to them within the context of a religious group. 
However, like the bald assertions at the start of the Resolution, the language of paragraph 8 
lacks precision. Even leaving aside the clumsy reference to ‘the British legal system’, the 
scare quotes around the words ‘judicial’ and ‘sharia councils’, as well as the final sentence, 
suggest that the Assembly may not be fully aware of the problem. The Resolution also 
presents the issue as if it only involved Muslims, despite the fact that other religions have 
formal tribunals – let alone informal means of dispute resolution – both within their 
communities and to decide status. Their existence is well-established and may in some 
circumstances be recognised by the secular courts: for example, in Kohn v Wagschal & Ors10 
the Court of Appeal refused to set aside an order for the enforcement of an award made by 
the London Beth Din under the terms of the Arbitration Act 1996.11 The research to date 
suggests that the paragraph is correct to say that the jurisdiction is mostly in relation to 
marriage and divorce: religious tribunals are primarily concerned with religious and marital 
status – and this underlines how the issue is not confined to Islam, as wits the system of 
Roman Catholic marriage tribunals.12 
 
The issue of concern is whether people are pressurised into the form of alternative dispute 
resolution provided by sharia councils. The Resolution distinguishes between situations 
where Muslims submit voluntarily and, alternatively, where they submit under social pressure 
– but then drops this distinction. This, however, is the nub of the issue. A decision to use a 
religious authority for dispute resolution which is genuinely voluntary on the part of both 
parties should be no more objectionable than any other form of alternative dispute 
resolution.13 Moreover, the courts should not enforce any adjudication where submission to 
the authority was not voluntarily – as is the case in relation to arbitrations under the 
                                                        
10 [2007] EWCA Civ 1022. 
11 In Ulman v Live Group Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 338, however, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales 
upheld a finding of criminal contempt of court against the judges [dayanim] and registrar of the Sydney Beth 
Din for threatening religious sanctions against a party to a commercial dispute who refused to submit to its 
jurisdiction: see F Cranmer, ‘May a religious tribunal threaten an uncooperative party with religious 
sanctions? Ulman’ in Law & Religion UK, 28 December 
2018, http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2018/12/28/may-a-religious-tribunal-threaten-an-uncooperative-party-
with-religious-sanctions-ulman/. 
12 See, for instance, G Douglas et al, The Role of Religious Tribunals in Regulating Marriage and Divorce’ 
(2012) 24 (2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 139. 
13 See G Douglas, ‘Who Regulates Marriage? The Case of Religious Marriage and Divorce’ in R Sandberg (ed) 
Religion and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate, 2015) 53.  
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Arbitration Act 1996. This, in turn, raises the question of how to determine ‘voluntariness’ 
and the level of voluntariness required. Most if not all forms of agreement are reached under 
some form of ‘social pressure’. It would be overly paternalistic and a denial of the free will of 
parties to say that all such agreements should automatically be regarded as null and void. 
Determining whether the pressure is ‘considerable’ will be tricky. Sandberg and Thompson 
have suggested that a relational contract approach that pays particular attention to vulnerable 
parties could provide a way forward14 and have suggested applying the approach that 
Thompson created in relation to prenuptial agreements.15  
 
The problem arises, however, where non-voluntary religious adjudications are not legally 
enforced but are enforced religiously and socially. It is arguable that this is where the secular 
authorities need to play a role and consider how oversight might be achieved – especially in a 
way that does not stigmatise the Muslim community – and how it might be extended to other 
situations of patriarchal or community pressure. However, such an approach will inevitably 
mean getting involved in the religious affairs of these groups and, in any event, the subject-
matter of some adjudications by religious tribunals will mean that they are unlikely to be 
legally enforced. This is true of the ‘marital and Islamic divorce issues’ mentioned in 
paragraph 8 of the Resolution. Religious institutions are not concerned with the status of a 
marriage or of its termination under State law: they are concerned solely with religious 
marriages – whether or not someone is married in the eyes of the faith. For some adherents, 
marriage can have both a religious and a legal dimension – but it should be borne in mind 
that religious institutions such as sharia councils are only concerned with the religious 
dimension. Adherents who have undergone a religious marriage that complied with the legal 
requirements may still feel married in the eyes of their faith after a civil divorce because they 
may feel that the civil divorce does not dissolve the religious marriage. However, the use of a 
religious institution is unlikely to be problematic in this scenario because the legal aspects of 
relationship breakdown will already have been dealt with. The abolition of most legal aid for 
family law cases under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
                                                        
14 R Sandberg and S Thompson 'Relational Autonomy and Religious Tribunals' (2017) Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion 137. 
15 S Thompson, Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and 
Practice (Hart, 2015); S Thompson, ‘Feminist Relational Contract Theory: A New Model for Family Property 
Agreements’ (2018) 45(4) Journal of Law and Society 617. Thompson’s suggested approach was applied by the 
Australian courts in Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49; see S Thompson, ‘Thorne v Kennedy: Why Australia’s 
Decision on Prenups is Important for English Law’ (2018) 48 Family Law 415. 
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provides a caveat to this;16 but for most of the time, the role of the sharia tribunal will be 
unproblematic. 
 
The problematic scenario is where the parties have gone through a religious marriage but 
have not complied with the legal requirements. This would give them little to no redress 
under civil law unless children are concerned.17 If their relationship broke down, their only 
port of call would be a religious authority such as a sharia council. The academic and policy 
literature has highlighted these so-called ‘unregistered marriages’ as the problem – and one 
that is specific to the Muslim community – but academic comment has often paid little 
attention to the reasons why unregistered marriages are taking place. The answer is not clear-
cut.18 Having a religious marriage that does not comply with the law on marriage registration 
might be deliberate or accidental. It might be because the law is unduly complex or 
restrictive. Alternatively, it might be because of a conscious choice by one or both parties not 
to have a civil marriage: observant Muslims often have a nikah just so that they can be 
together without being chaperoned. Equally, it might result from a lack of awareness that the 
religious marriage has not been registered. Another possibility is that a couple might simply 
be unaware that a marriage under the secular law is needed in order to establish rights on 
separation and death – a possibility buttressed by recent research showing the general 
persistence of belief in ‘common law marriage’.19 
 
There are numerous ways in which this issue could be tackled. Education and awareness 
would be key. Some legislative reform might be necessary: Sandberg and Thompson have 
                                                        
16 See J Mant and J Wallbank, ‘The Mysterious Case of Disappearing Family Law and the Shrinking 
Vulnerable Subject: The Shifting Sands of Family Law’s Jurisdiction’ (2017) 26(5) Social and Legal Studies 
629; J Mant, ‘Neoliberalism, Family Law and the Cost of Access to Justice’ (2017) 39(2) Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 246 
17 In Akhter v Khan [2018] EWFC 54 the core issue was whether or not a nikah ceremony that had never been 
validated by a subsequent civil registration was a non-marriage or gave rise to a void marriage; Williams J held 
that, because the couple had four children, it was appropriate to take their interests into account (para 93b): see 
F Cranmer ‘Does an unregistered nikah wedding give rise to a valid marriage, a void marriage or a non-
marriage? (2019) 41 (1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 96. 
18 In the same way that there will be differing intentions or lack of intentions amongst cohabiting couples 
generally as discussed by A Barlow and J Smithson, ‘Legal Assumptions, Cohabitants’ Talk and the Rocky 
Road to Reform’ (2010) 22(3) Child and Family Quarterly 328.  
19The first findings from the latest British Social Attitudes Survey have revealed that almost half of respondents 
in England and Wales – 46 per cent – believed that unmarried couples who live together had a ‘common law 
marriage’ with the same rights as couples that are legally married and that only 41 per cent knew that common 
law marriage is a myth: National Centre for Social Research (2019) ‘Almost half of us mistakenly believe that 
common law marriage exists’, available at <http://www.natcen.ac.uk/news-media/press-
releases?alttemplate=SharedNews&y=2019&m=january&n=almost-half-of-us-mistakenly-believe-that-
common-law-marriage-exists>. 
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argued that the changes that are arguably necessary in family law generally (namely the 
modernisation of marriage formalities and rights for cohabiting couples) would also mitigate 
the ‘unregistered marriages’ issue.20 However, doing what the Resolution does – condemning 
sharia councils in general and broad terms for their ‘judicial’ activities –is unhelpful and 
emphatically not the answer. Denying religious groups any form of adjudicatory function 
would render them unable to operate. All social groups need rules and need to interpret and 
apply their rules. The Resolution names sharia councils in the United Kingdom because 
research and policy documents have highlighted their existence. But we only know the tip of 
the iceberg. We know what the most high-profile and mainstream sharia councils want to tell 
us about themselves: we know next to nothing about how other institutions within religious 
and cultural bodies formally and informally adjudicate. That final sentence of paragraph 8, 
which states that ‘informal Islamic Courts may exist in other Council of Europe Member 
States too’, is also true of the UK. It would be more accurate to say that ‘informal means of 
religious adjudication probably exist in all Council of Europe Member States’. It is difficult 
to shake off the impression that the Assembly is unable properly to identify the issue – let 
alone the solution – and so has opted for a simplistic and ultimately counterproductive 
reductionist tirade against sharia. 
 
SUGGESTED ACTIONS  
The lack of nuance and understanding is even more evident, however, in paragraph 14 where 
the Assembly calls on the authorities of the United Kingdom to take various actions: 
 
‘The Assembly, while welcoming the recommendations put forward in the 
conclusions of the Home Office Independent review into the application of Sharia law 
in England and Wales, as a major step towards a solution, calls on the authorities of 
the United Kingdom to: 
14.1 ensure that Sharia councils operate within the law, especially as it relates to the 
prohibition of discrimination against women and respect all procedural rights; 
14.2 review the Marriage Act to make it a legal requirement for Muslim couples to 
civilly register their marriage before or at the same time as their Islamic ceremony, as 
is already stipulated by law for Christian and Jewish marriages; 
                                                        
20 R Sandberg and S Thompson, ‘The Sharia Law Debate: The Missing Family Law Context’ (2016) 177 Law & 
Justice 181. 
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14.3 take appropriate enforcement measures to oblige the celebrant of any marriage, 
including Islamic marriages, to ensure that the marriage is also civilly registered 
before or at the same time as celebrating the religious marriage; 
14.4. remove the barriers to Muslim women’s access to justice and step up measures 
to provide protection and assistance to those who are in a situation of vulnerability; 
14.5. put in place awareness campaigns to promote knowledge of their rights amongst 
Muslim women, especially in the areas of marriage, divorce, custody of children and 
inheritance, and work with Muslim communities, women organisations and other 
non-governmental organisations to promote gender equality and women’s 
empowerment; 
14.6 conduct further research on “judicial” practice of Sharia councils and on the 
extent to which such councils are used voluntarily, particularly by women, many of 
whom would be subject to intense community pressure in this respect.’ 
 
Paragraph 14.1 is laudable but rather general and raises the issue of how the procedures of 
sharia councils will be monitored or regulated without, in so doing, giving them some kind of 
formal recognition and legitimacy. The fact that we do not know how many such councils 
there are, let alone the number or existence of less formal religious forms of adjudication, 
makes this recommendation difficult to fulfil in a meaningful way. Furthermore, in 
its Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper21 the UK Government has already 
dismissed the idea of any kind of formal recognition. Referring to the proposal for regulation 
made by the independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales,22 
commissioned by the Home Office and chaired by Professor Mona Siddiqui, the Green Paper 
stated categorically that though the Government ‘will explore the legal and practical 
challenges of limited reform relating to the law on marriage and religious weddings’, it 
considered that ‘the review’s proposal to create a state-facilitated or endorsed regulation 
scheme for sharia councils would confer upon them legitimacy as alternative forms of dispute 
resolution’ and that such a scheme would be inappropriate.23 
 
Paragraph 14.2 appears to be based both on a misunderstanding of the law in England and 
Wales and on a misunderstanding of the wider issue. The Marriage Act already requires civil 
                                                        
21 HM Government. Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper, Cm 9560 (London, HMSO 2018). 
22 Home Office, The independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales (2018).  
23Ibid 58. 
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registration in order for marriages to become lawful; but how that registration is achieved 
depends on the denomination in question. In the case of ‘Christian and Jewish marriages’, it 
is not ‘stipulated by law’ that the parties should always ‘civilly register their marriage’. 
Under the terms of the Marriage Act 1949, marriages conducted in the Church of England 
and the Church in Wales are valid marriages in secular law ipso facto, without any additional 
formalities. As to Quakers and Jews, the procedure is laid down by their respective 
communities and recognised under the 1949 Act. Two Quakers who wish to marry, for 
example, must complete a joint declaration of an intention to marry and give it to the Area 
Meeting registering officer and, in England and Wales, give notice of intention as required by 
the civil law to the appropriate registrar and obtain the necessary certificates. The Area 
Meeting’s registering officer must then arrange for public notice of the intended marriage in 
the meeting or meetings to which the couple belong or which they usually attend, arrange for 
the solemnisation of the marriage at the meeting for worship and, immediately after the 
meeting for worship in England and Wales, arrange for the registration of the marriage.24 But 
there is no separate act of civil registration: the ceremony is what happens in the meeting 
house and the ‘civil part’ is effected by the registering officer’s return to the General Register 
Office. 
 
Muslims are in the same position as all other religious groups apart from the Church of 
England, the Church in Wales, Quaker and Jews but, in essence, the law is the same: for there 
to be a lawful marriage, the Marriage Act 1949 must be complied with. The issue is not that 
the Act itself needs reviewing (or, at any rate, not on those particular grounds) but that some 
couples in the Muslim community are not using the Act. As noted above, this might be for a 
variety of reasons. A ‘legal requirement’ could be added if it was decided to make religious 
marriages unlawful and, at the moment, purely religious marriages without civil registration 
are not valid marriages under English law – but we would argue that making such marriages 
unlawful would not increase the rights and protections for the parties within them. 
 
The same is true of the requirement in paragraph 14.3. This would require the State to police 
religious acts of worship and to outlaw anything that looks like a religious marriage unless 
the 1949 Act is complied with. As Sandberg has argued elsewhere, imposing criminal or 
                                                        
24 Britain Yearly Meeting (2018) Quaker faith &practice: ‘Quaker marriage procedure’ 16.18, 16.20, 16.61, 
available at <https://qfp.quaker.org.uk/chapter/16/>. 
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indeed civil liability upon celebrants misses the point.25 There is no evidence that celebrants 
are advising couples that the Marriage Act 1949 does not need to be complied with and if 
there were such evidence, then surely it would be best dealt with by means other than legal 
sanction. If celebrants are deliberately not following the procedures in the Act, it already 
includes a number of existing provisions to deal with that: section 75 provides a number of 
offences when marriages are solemnised but the Act is not complied with, while section 76 
provides for offences relating to the registration of marriages.  
 
The recommendations in paragraphs 14.4 and 14.5 are unobjectionable. Education and 
awareness raising is clearly needed, especially with regard to gender disadvantage. However, 
the fact that the Resolution itself is unclear shows a significant obstacle to this. Although ‘the 
religious marriage’ is mentioned in paragraph 14.3, elsewhere the Resolution adopts a very 
State-centric view of marriage. Paragraph 14.2 sharply distinguishes between ‘Islamic 
ceremonies’ and ‘Christian and Jewish marriages’. This is why the call for more research in 
paragraph 14.6 is sound, but such research should be the foundation for the recommendations 
rather than an afterthought. Any research needs to do much more than focus ‘on “judicial” 
practice of Sharia councils’: for it to be worthwhile, its focus needs to be on religious 
adjudication more broadly and on the overall legal framework pertaining to marriage and 
divorce. This involves asking the big questions about the essence of marriage and the role 
and interest of the State.26 There is also a need to focus more on the structural and personal 
disadvantages that exist: as Thompson and Sandberg have argued more generally, work in 
Law and Religion needs to centre ‘upon gender and the questions of power this raises’.27 
 
CONCLUSION  
The Parliamentary Assembly is right to be ‘concerned’.28 However, its articulation of the 
issue and its recommendations show that its concern is based largely on moral panic about 
sharia councils. This moral panic needs to be contextualised in several respects. We need to 
look more broadly at religious adjudication, at how law can deal with adjudications that are 
                                                        
25 R Sandberg. ‘Criminalising Imams will not Solve the Problem of Unregistered Marriages’ LexisNexis Family 
Law blog, 15 January 2019 <https://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/criminalising-imams-will-not-
solve-the-problem-of-unregistered-marriages>. 
26 Nicola Barker’s work usefully distinguishes between the structure, consequences and ideologies of marriage: 
N Barker, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same Sex Marriage (Palgrave. 2012) 22-23. 
27 S Thompson and R Sandberg, ‘Multicultural Jurisdictions: The Need for a Feminist Approach to Law and 
Religion in R Sandberg (ed) Leading Works in Law and Religion (Routledge, 2019) 179, 195. 
28 Para 8. 
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enforced religiously and socially in contexts where legal enforcement has not been sought or 
is irrelevant, at how the law can determine whether or not an agreement is voluntary, at why 
unregistered marriages are taking place, at whether there are similarities in cause and effect 
between the issues that unregistered marriages raise and at more general concerns about 
whether family law reflects and facilitates the ways in which adult personal relationships are 
formed, exist and are publicly marked in the twenty-first century. 
 
The way in which sharia councils are represented as a discrete problem that requires ad hoc 
and often kneejerk reform is deeply problematic. Not only does it caricature the issue as a 
Muslim problem, but it both creates an expectation that there will be a solution and, crucially, 
obscures the need for wholesale reform. Examining the merits of specific changes means that 
a considered examination of different options is not undertaken. This is especially to be 
regretted in the Family Law context, given that comparative insights can gleaned from the 
different jurisdictions within the British Isles and, of course, further afield. The Resolution 
itself, though relating to the UK, gives the impression of having been conceived exclusively 
in terms of the law of England and Wales. Wedding law in Northern Ireland and in Scotland 
proceeds from an entirely different principle: the registration of celebrants for religion or 
belief marriages rather than the registration of buildings. Cranmer and Thompson have 
argued that, while no system can be proof against a determined intention to subvert it, the 
relative clarity of marriage procedure in Northern Ireland and in Scotland compared that of 
England and Wales makes it considerably less likely that a marriage ceremony could be 
defective merely because of incompetence or ignorance on the part of the couple or the 
celebrant.29 This underlines the need for a considered, comparative approach that places the 
‘sharia problem’ not only in the wider context of the law on adult relationships but also 
within the context of how different jurisdictions (including different jurisdictions within the 
UK) regulate intimate personal relationships. 
 
The Resolution’s call for further research is a welcome and necessary precursor to identifying 
and remedying the matters of concern and, though not always as well articulated as they 
might be, the Assembly’s misgivings are generally sound. In our view, however, its 
                                                        
29 F Cranmer and S Thompson, ‘Marriage and Civil Partnership in Northern Ireland: A Changing Legal 
Landscape’ (2018) 30(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 301.  
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recommendations are misguided, naive and likely to hinder the laudable aims behind the 
Resolution. A considered, comparative and comprehensive approach is required. 
 
 
 
 
